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CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS, VERTICAL DIS-INTEGRATION AND INTER-FIRM COOPERATION
Historically, networks of fi rms have preceded the vertically integrated fi rm and, to a certain extent, markets, at least within the contemporary meaning, attached to this particular form of organization. 1 In this book, the focus is on networks for the production of goods and services. However, it should be underlined that contractual networks have largely been deployed to create and regulate markets. In the area of the electronic trading platform, contractual networks defi ne the common rules that preside over the individual transactions of the members who have subscribed to the platform. 2 Contractual networks have also fl ourished in the area of regulated markets where technological factors may 'impose' sharing common platforms for production or more often distribution. Examples range from electricity to telecommunications, from banking to insurance.
Networks of fi rms have diff erent forms, including contractual, organizational and combined. Often enterprises start with a contractual network that is perceived as a lighter form of commitment, but which subsequently evolves into an organizational network. Notice that even in the case of contractual networks, enterprises create a new company but preserve their own legal and economic independence. At other times the organizational network 'integrates' the contractual one. This combination can take different forms: in its softest version, fi rms make a governance agreement for a mutual interlocking directorate. Each fi rm, even without owning shares, has the right to appoint a member of the other fi rm's board. Stronger forms of integration between contractual and organizational networks include the creation of a company comprising the contractual partners for limited purposes, often related to fi nancing and limited liability towards third parties. Integration also occurs for the common management of a trademark. Two or more enterprises, some involved in production and some in distribution, collectively own a trademark and create a company to regulate and coordinate activities. 3 After a strong, yet not homogeneous, path towards vertical integration at the beginning of the last century, coinciding with the emergence of the Chandlerian model, technological and political changes, leading to greater globalization of trade and stronger interdependence among the world's economies, have produced new forms of de-verticalization with which the re-emergence of the network form is associated. 4 In particular, it is related to the transformation of the supply chain and its vertical disintegration, taking place at both the domestic and transnational level. 5 The recent fi nancial crisis combined with some protectionist measures is again pushing towards vertical integration by providing fi nancial incentives to enterprises in developed countries not to outsource outside their countries.
Vertical integration, even when high interdependence and high asset specifi city are considerable, might not be the fi rst-best solution, let alone a feasible way to address these issues. 6 Technology constitutes only a partial response to the risks correlated to high asset specifi city and may bring about very diff erent contractual relationships. On the one hand, modularity can sometimes outbalance asset specifi city and push towards relational contracting. 7 ICT like Building information modelling (BIM), Introduction on the other hand, fosters collaboration among the participants to the project and confl icts with the current contract law approach, pushing towards the creation of contractual networks. These technologies are at odds with the traditional contractual approach which divides responsibilities among the diff erent parties, dis-incentivizing cooperation. They redefi ne product and service design and promote a collaborative approach that increases the quality of product design but at the same time renders harder the allocation of responsibility among individual parties. Many of the features of product design come from subcontractors and consultants; they translate into co-design, posing intellectual property right issues as to the ownership of the design. Furthermore and for opposite reasons, liability questions arise when the design is defective and parties try to disclaim liability, blaming other participants in the network. In sum, new technologies strongly aff ect contracting practices but do not substitute for them. They often require radical changes in the approach to contract and to dispute resolution. They may operate as a factor driving towards higher collaboration but also towards fragmentation.
How is vertical dis-integration related to the emergence of diff erent forms of contracting? Supply chain value is distributed in diff erent ways giving rise to diff erent forms of coordination depending on the distribution of market and contractual power. The transfer of value along the supply chain defi nes patterns of integration and determines the combination of relational contracting and networks. 8 Vertical disintegration has taken diff erent forms. Outsourcing and off shoring have stimulated the use of contractual networks, strategic alliances and other types of hybrids. 9 Diff erent forms of outsourcing may generate various networks depending on whether outsourcing is complete or partial, i.e. part of the activity remains inside the fi rm, giving rise to co-sourcing. A second and, perhaps more important, variable is related to the phase or set of outsourced phases: whether they concern standardized processes or focus on the core, strategic activity of the fi rm. The increasing phenomenon of outsourcing R&D to consortia refl ects changes about the necessity to keep 'strategic' functions inside the fi rm. New technologies R. Langlois, 'Chandler in a larger frame: Markets, transaction costs and organisational form in history ', 5 Enterprise & Society 355 (2004) and other types of safeguards permit more intense forms of collaboration among fi rms with decreasing risk of information leakage.
We thus observe at both domestic and transnational level the coexistence of integrated supply chains with powerful multinational corporations (MNC) and less vertically integrated chains where higher fragmentation occurs either upstream or downstream. Contractual networks emerge for diff erent reasons: often they constitute a response to ownership fragmentation and small size. The existence of regulatory and cultural obstacles to integration pushes towards the creation of networks based on independent ownership and coordinated activities. 10 Conventional industrial organization theory distinguishes between different forms of production: markets, hybrids, vertically integrated fi rms. 11 The more traditional dichotomy between markets and fi rms, built on Coase's seminal article, has been broadened and relaxed to include networks and other forms of hybrids. 12 As mentioned above, the factors aff ecting the choice between diff erent organizational modes have also changed for technological reasons. Knowledge production and distribution have become key dimensions due to the increasing importance of technological innovation. 13 These operate in relation to both inputs and outputs, giving rise to diff erent forms of networks.
As to inputs, networks arise when resources' complementarity is needed. Inputs' complementarity has blurred the line between product design and process implementation. The design of a product or a combination of products, as in construction with the introduction of building information modelling (BIM), is the outcome of participation by many players, including those who build the product: the designer, architect or engineer, the main contractor, the subcontractors. The design is revised and integrated while the construction process takes place, thereby increasing the diffi culty of identifying each party's responsibility for the design and its implementation. Networks arise to implement collaborative technologies that make allocation of individual responsibilities costly and diffi cult, requiring forms of risk sharing. 10 For an illustration of how regulatory constraints may positively aff ect the formation of networks see F. Cafaggi and P. Iamiceli, 'Comparative Analysis', in F. Cafaggi 
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As to output, networks emerge when output is indivisible, for example because the new produced knowledge cannot be incorporated into an intellectual property right (IPR) or the property right can not be subdivided. 14 When this feature occurs, networks are at a competitive advantage over discrete contracting. While propertizable knowledge has always been held compatible with discrete contracting, for a long time a large amount of knowledge that could not be propertized and even tacit knowledge were thought decisive factors in vertical integration and the use of corporate form. 15 More recently, it has been held that contracting for innovation may take place even if knowledge exchanges cannot occur through property rights but have to be secured through contractual means. 16 The understanding of contractual relations has also evolved over time, focusing more and more on contractual governance. 17 When relational contracts are in place, involving multiple parties with a high degree of interdependence of capabilities and resources, the traditional contractual dichotomy between exchange and organizations loses its explanatory bite and calls for new categories in contract theory. 18 This stream of the literature has been complemented by that on incomplete contracts. 19 Contractual networks largely fi t into the particular category of incomplete contracts where both ex ante design and allocation of rights and ex 14 See on output indivisibility and theory of the fi rm A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, 'Team production theory ', 62 American Economic Review (1972) ', Columbia Law Review, 2003. post adjudication represent a second-best solution to incompleteness. 20 They respond to diffi culties concerning observability of performance standards, deploying information technologies fostering cooperation. They require governance devices to monitor and to steer the web of relationships taking place inside the network based on peer monitoring. 21 They increase verifi ability and often devise dispute resolution mechanisms that reduce litigation costs. Such governance devices often diff er from those deployed by corporate law and contribute to aligning interests inside the network and to responding to exogenous shocks coming from markets' evolution. Often a network contract is better able to complement formal and informal contracting than the corporate law form where higher procedural requirements, especially for listed companies, preclude the use of informal arrangements. 22 Networks are often juxtaposed with hierarchies on the assumption that decision-making power is distributed symmetrically. This is not necessarily the case. In practice, the decision-making power inside a network can be distributed highly asymmetrically and still be compatible with the network form, where economic interdependence does not translate into legal integration. Thus we observe networks with even and uneven distribution of power. The enterprises belonging to the network are legally independent. Unlike business groups in networks, there is no control by one fi rm over the others. 23 Legal independence may be related to economic dependence translating into hierarchical networks where the dominant fi rm dictates terms of cooperation both among the others and between them and the dominant fi rm. The diff erent contractual power within a network may infl uence how governance operates and how the entry and exit of individual parties are regulated. Diff erences in power may be refl ected in divergent interests among network participants which require 20 See R. Scott and G. Triantis, 'Anticipating litigation, in contract design ', Yale Law Journal (2006) , 814ff .; R. Scott and G. Triantis, Foundations of Commercial Law, Foundation Press, 2009. 21 Often contractual networks set up management or executive committees composed of representatives of each participant to monitor compliance and adjust the objectives according to new circumstances. 22 See R. Gilson, C. Sabel and R. Scott, 'Braiding: the interaction of formal and informal contracting in theory, practice and doctrine', available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1535575. 23 Business groups are distinguished from multibusiness fi rms: 'Business groups combine strong ownership and weak control over numerous fi rms contrary to multibusiness fi rms with their weak owners and strong managers'. See F.M. Fruin, 'Business groups and interfi rm networks', in The Oxford Handbook of Business History, above n. 1, p. 248. eff ective governance design to protect the incentives of weaker parties to enter and their freedom to exit.
Strong asymmetry of contractual power is often refl ected in the deployment of bilateral linked contracts, while a relatively more even distribution of contractual and market power is often associated with the use of multilateral contracts. Empirically, the latter model emerges more frequently when parties have similar initial contractual power or want to distribute decision-making power evenly even if outside the network diff erences among the parties are substantial. 24 However, it is not rare for the use of standard multilateral contract forms to create a network where one enterprise drafts the contract and the others simply adhere to it. 25 Both horizontal and vertical networks encompass a collective interest but also individual, often diverging, interests. The governance of the network responds diff erently to the combination between collective and individual confl icting interests. Eff ective contract design should refl ect the ability to promote the collective interest while aligning individual confl icting interests.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLUSTERS AND INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS
The concept and role of networks of enterprises diff er from those of clusters and industrial districts although there are common themes. Industrial districts and clusters have been characterized by territorial concentration, specialization. They have been described as an alternative model to the vertically integrated fi rms, highlighting some of the diff erential features. 26 Their competitive advantages have been identifi ed with superior ability to adapt to changes in markets and technologies. 27 Economies of agglomeration and specialization have characterized these systems and their ability to generate modes of governance capable of internalizing 24 The latter can happen for example when a research fi rm with a high level of knowledge and patent ownership is involved in a joint venture with a producer of goods and services which does not have an internal innovative R&D department.
25 This is the case with trading platforms, for example, eBay in the fi eld of electronic commerce. 26 collectively positive externalities. These economies and other competitive factors such as the higher level of trust are not themselves the most important competitive factors. Rather they may constitute the basis for and the driver to an institutional setting composed of diff erent types of organisation aimed at providing services that rationalize these micromarkets and ensure eff ectiveness of non legal sanctions related to reputation, blaming and shaming. However the recent transformation of districts and local production systems have imposed changes in governance in order to control supply chains ever more geographically dispersed. 28 For the traditional local institutions centred around public-private partnerships, collective private organizations and local fi nancial institutions, there has been the development of supply-chain governance that captures enterprises located geographically outside the local production system. 29 These include electronic platforms and e-governance devices in order to link actors located outside the territorial boundaries of the district.
Industrial districts, in the Marshallian sense, only represent a subset of local production systems, generally characterized by the predominance of local ties even if their strong export identity has always contributed to a global dimension. 30 The diff erence with other production systems depends on the relationship between core and periphery and whether a qualitative or quantitative criterion is adopted to defi ne agglomeration. With delocalization, the number of enterprises operating locally has signifi cantly decreased. However the core, i.e. the physical place where ideas and processes were developed, has often remained rooted in one geographical area. Only by shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative criterion to identify the district can these ties be considered still as part of a local production system.
The ability to govern competition and cooperation, thereby increasing industrial performance, is clearly an element which can also be referred to the relationship among enterprises within networks. However, both the modes of cooperation and competition diff er.
THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN CONTRACT AND CORPORATE LAW: THE CHALLENGES POSED BY CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS
The selection of organizational form defi nes the economic and the legal boundaries of enterprises. 31 While the choice between organizations and contracts operates within a bright line where the boundaries are well defi ned, networks are generally associated with grey areas where the level of interdependence may be so high that, despite formal legal independence, enterprises may be strongly enmeshed. 32 Contractual networks challenge the partition between contract and company law because they require governance devices that refl ect a higher level of complexity than conventional bilateral contracts without creating a new entity. They capture interdependences among contracts beyond privity and concern the creation of rights and the imposition of liabilities on third parties well beyond the conventional domain of contract law, grounded on the ideal-type of bilateral contracting. They may require fi nancial resources to pursue the common project and to engage with third parties to buy or to sell outputs. 33 The challenge to the conventional divide becomes particularly strong in multiparty contracts. The boundaries between multilateral contracts and organizations are not well defi ned and the literature on contractual networks focuses primarily on bilateral 31 See P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, 'The boundaries of the fi rm revisited', 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 73 (1998); M. Blair and R. Thompson, 'What determines the boundary of the fi rm? An essay on the role of law and legal institutions', Working Paper (2008), L. Zingales, 'Corporate governance', The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan, 1998, 487 ff . 32 The move from contract to vertically integrated fi rms transforms contractual relationships into employment relationships. What in the fi rst instance is a contract between two legal autonomous entities becomes a relationship between two divisions or in the case of a business group, two formally autonomous legal entities both controlled by a third entity. In business groups, the relationship between entities is contractual but these contracts are execution of the will of the controlling party. In a vertically integrated fi rm, the relationship is defi ned by employment law and performance is generally designed by the management. 33 See Geiss, above n. 9 and from a diff erent perspective Teubner, above, n. 17, p. 3 ff . linked contracts without devoting suffi cient attention to multiparty contracts and how they diff er from corporate entities.
In the conventional view, contracts are represented as ventures where parties have a common interest in maximizing the surplus from trade but confl icting interests over how to distribute the surplus. Cooperation is considered instrumental in generating the contractual surplus to be divided. 34 The existence of a common goal among the parties is generally associated with the use of organizations and the boundaries between contract and organization cut across the line between competition (contract) and cooperation (organization). Clearly a more sophisticated view of contract recognizes that contractual relationships can encompass both a cooperative and a competitive dimension, but the presence of a common interest is generally considered to be foreign to contract and contract law and defi nes the domain of company law. An additional element is represented by the 'nature' of knowledge. Contracts are generally deployed when property rights can be ex ante well defi ned, while organizational models are preferred when knowledge cannot be easily 'propertized' ex ante. For example, one can compare the context where the main contractor owns a patent and asks the subcontractors to manufacture the product accordingly (intellectual property rights are ex ante well defi ned) with that where the main contractor does not have a patent and wants to co-design the product with subcontractors. The fi nal project will be the outcome of exchanges among them. In the latter case, the conventional view suggests that an organizational model is best suited. These views have analytical appeal because they divide the world of industrial organization into two separate worlds and depending on the level of uncertainty, push for the use of contract or organizations. However, they have little correspondence with reality where contractual networks emerge to implement projects characterized by a high level of uncertainty where parties have to organize complementary knowledge and develop safeguards to prevent leakages towards third parties. 35 Not only are contracts compatible with a high level of ex ante uncertainty but the two models can often complement each 34 More recent research suggests that fairness in the allocation of the surplus is somewhat relevant and aff ects incentives to enter into a contractual relationship and to structure the deal. See E. Fehr and S. Gächter, 'Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity', 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2000), 159-81; E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher and S. Gächter, 'Strong reciprocity, human cooperation and the enforcement of social norms', 13 Nature (2002), 1-25. 35 The puzzling question is why parties prefer contractual over organizational networks when they develop common projects deploying complementary knowledge.
other. Contractual networks frequently arise in the area of R&D and are often combined with organizational models. Empirical research shows that often contractual models are fi rst to emerge, then they are 'stabilized' by way of complementary organizational models that may provide additional fi nancial resources and are more eff ective in dealing with third parties. 36 As the German and the Italian approaches clarify, contractual networks have a common goal (Netz zweck, scopo comune) to be combined with those of the individual participants. 37 But the existence of a common goal does not inevitably lead to an organizational model. This goal may translate into specifi c relationships between the network and single members, with a web of duties and rights generally framed within the general clause of loyalty. The duty of loyalty of individual contractual participants towards the network implies covenants not to compete, duties to inform and best eff orts clauses, among other things. But contractual networks also present distributional issues concerning risk and profi t allocation frequently thought of as typical of the organizational model. They often emerge as a response to a more eff ective risk allocation system concerning the fi nal product or service where interdependences of performances are high even among non-direct contractual partners. The distinction seems to be a matter of degree: organizational models imply full sharing of inputs, profi ts and losses; but more importantly, they correlate the former with the latter in diff erent ways from those that can be deployed in contractual networks. The diff erences become more radical when the relationship with third parties is considered. In organizational models, limited liability is the rule; in contractual networks, unlimited liability is the rule in the form of both individual and joint liability. Parties to the network are considered to be joint debtors or creditors of the third party.
Contractual networks often display a broader set of arrangements to allocate internal liability and diff erentiate its allocation vis-à-vis third parties. Often parties need to diff erentiate internal allocation from external allocation because the cheapest cost avoider is not always the best insurer. 36 Typically, while in the fi rst stage when the new knowledge has to be produced parties limit themselves to contractual networks, when the new knowledge is produced the implementation of the project is based at a new company. See F. Cafaggi and P. Iamiceli, 'Reti di imprese e modelli di governo interimprenditoriale: analisi comparativae prospettive di approfondimento; in F. Cafaggi and P. Iamiceli (eds), Reti di imprese tra crescita ed innovazione organizzativa, Rifl essioni da una ricerca sul campo Mulino, 2007, 279-332. 37 Grundmann criticizes the use of quasi-company theory to explain and regulate contractual networks. See Chapter 5 below.
Therefore the risk of default may be placed unevenly among the partners even if joint and several liability is the rule towards external parties.
FORMAL AND INFORMAL AGREEMENTS WITHIN CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS
The existence of networks has often been associated with informal relationships, with claims that fl exibility to adapt requires informality. This association has been described empirically and even at times theorized, contending that reciprocity and trust may ensure self-enforceability or emphasizing the role of social norms and non-legal institutions. 38 This approach has often limited the emergence of a legal concept of network. 39 Empirical research shows that contractual networks as formalized arrangements exist and play an important role in coordinating activities among fi rms to induce and preserve incentives to cooperate. Thus a formal concept of contractual networks is not only theoretically possible but also empirically accurate.
In a frame of formalized contractual network that is legally enforceable, the relevant question concerns which combination between formal and informal elements exist. The level of formalization changes signifi cantly in relation to fi rms' size; contractual networks tend to be highly formalized when strategic alliances among big multinational fi rms are concluded, while a more balanced combination of formal and informal terms exists in contractual networks composed of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Within the latter, the level of formal arrangements increases with their internationalization, while a higher degree of informal agreements exists in domestic networks. 40 38 For a very sophisticated historical approach, see A. Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from the Medieval Trade CUP, 2006. In this volume, see F. Gómez, Chapter 2. 39 See R. Buxbaum, 'Is "network" a legal concept? ', 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 4 (1993) , 698-705 and in a diff erent perspective Teubner, above, n. 17, pp. 3 ff . 40 See F. Cafaggi and P. Iamiceli, above n. 10. In empirical research conducted in the years 2008-9 concerning the European wine industry, where representatives of 170 enterprises were interviewed, the level of formal enforceable contracts within networks was relatively high. The concept of formalization goes well beyond the boundary between enforceable and non-enforceable contracts but includes also the use of written contracts, sometimes even standard contracts. What allows for fl exibility is the partition between complete and incomplete contracts. Contracts within networks are formalized but incomplete and often the part which is not Part of the debate concerning the level of informality is better framed within the issue of contractual incompleteness. Contractual networks diff er from bilateral contracts because often completion occurs by way of informal means. Experimental economics has showed that at times incompleteness may foster cooperation and reciprocity, while formalization may crowd them out. 41 While the contracts within the network have a degree of defi niteness compatible with the requirements for a binding contract, the modes of completion for each individual contract, given their independence, may deploy informal mechanisms. This is the result of two main factors:
(1) the need for fl exibility requires coordination that is often in confl ict with legal formalism; (2) current contract law makes legal coordination among linked contracts quite complex.
For example, whether a contract should be considered an output contract or not might be decided according to external factors. If information is not available ex ante, parties may conclude an incomplete contract and leave open the defi nition of quantity.
THE AIMS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The book is structured in three parts: in the fi rst, the place and scope of contractual networks is analysed in the light of contract law and theory. Within this analysis, the implications from economics are examined through the lens of the relationship between fi rms and credit institutions. Part II looks at diff erent European legal systems in order to compare how they provide the legal framework for the emergence and stabilization of networks. The contributions confi rm that rather diff erent approaches are taken and more comparative institutional analysis is needed from the perspective of the creation of a European regime. Part III is devoted to the role of private international law and the European transnational networks. complete plays a strategic role in the relationship. Furthermore contracts between wine producers and distributors are more formalized than those between grapegrowers and wine-makers. 41 Fernando Gómez's contribution analyses the place of contractual network in contract theory. The high level of transaction costs, high physical and human asset specifi city, do not necessarily lead to vertical integration. Gómez underlines that contractual networks emerge to induce and sustain cooperation among parties. Cooperation may be induced by reducing opportunism or increasing the benefi ts of remaining in the relationship if parties can earn quasi-rents. Relation-specifi c investments may become the engine of cooperation if the contractual design is well engineered. Furthermore, increasing switching costs in open-ended relationships can promote cooperative behaviour. Cooperation needs a strong governance framework to face several problems mainly associated with contract incompleteness: 'multidimensionality of behaviour, uncertainty surrounding actions and outcomes, long-term character, infl uence of future contingencies, investments by the parties that can enhance, maybe very signifi cantly, the value of the interaction, but with a high degree of specifi city, and thus, are subject to the risk of extortionary negotiation or hold-up'. He points out, following game theory and in particular the trust game, that duration, the long-term nature of the relationships, is not itself suffi cient to warrant cooperation. According to Gomez: 'If the game is played repeatedly a fi nite number of times, the lack of incentives to cooperate, even if it is in the best long-term interest of both contracting parties, is as unsustainable as in a one-shot version of the interaction. . . if the relationship is open-ended on both sides, cooperatives outcomes are likely to arise'. Gomez argues that bilateral termination rights may provide incentives to cooperate. While he recognizes that termination rights can be abused and misused, he contends that mandatory prohibition of termination rights may reduce, not increase, incentives to cooperate. The solution is to grant termination rights and carefully police their exercise.
In their chapter, Scalera and Zazzaro aim to provide a selective review of the literature on inter-fi rm networks and access to fi nance, giving an account of both the main results to date and the issues that are still unresolved. In particular, two main questions are addressed: whether fi nance is a motivation driving the formation of inter-fi rm networks and which forms they might take. Subsequently they explore whether inter-fi rm networking increases the availability of fi nancial resources for network members, and if so, through which channels.
In Chapter 4, Cafaggi describes the main models of contractual networks: network of contracts (composed of several interdependent bilateral contracts) and networks of enterprises (coinciding with multilateral contracts). He suggests that these two models represent ideal-types within which several variations have developed in practice. He fi rst describes the structural features of the two models and then compares them on the basis of previous empirical research. The comparison suggests that the relevant variables infl uencing choice comprise six dimensions: uncertainty and contract incompleteness, interdependence, ownership, competition, decision-making power and governance. Each of these factors infl uences the choice between a network involving a bilateral contract or a multilateral contract.
The second part of the book shows how diff erent the approaches in Germany, France and England are. In none of these legal systems are networks, as defi ned by the economic and sociological literature, regulated. Italy was the fi rst country to introduce specifi c legislation in 2009/2010 concerning contractual networks. 42 The Italian legislation refers only to contractual network, leaving out organizational networks, with a regime that designs contractual governance distinguishing between network design and management.
The German system described by Stefan Grundmann shows a wide array of instruments to address linked contracts as the expression of a network. He distinguishes between primary and secondary claims and proposes to look fi rst at duties and only afterwards at liabilities in order to identify the network Within the duties, a distinction should be made between main performance, ancillary duties and protective duties. A network does not arise every time there is liability towards third parties outside the contract. Unlike other systems which have used extensively tort law to address liability for breach of contract towards third parties, the narrower scope of German tort law has stimulated the creative use of contract law to capture interdependencies. Grundmann examines very diff erent types of networks ranging from the production and distribution chain to the interaction between prospectus issuers, advisers and certifi ers and investors. By, indirectly, emphasizing the diff erence with the French model, he clarifi es that the precondition for a claimant to go after a third party is the inability to bring a claim against the contractual partner. Otherwise, Grundmann concludes, third party claims should be ruled out.
The French system described by Carole Aubert de Vincelles clearly distinguishes between chaines and groupes de contrats. In her chapter she focuses on contrats liés, defi nes when they exist and what are their eff ects. After considering conditions and ancillary contracts, she analyses the concept of indivisibilité (inseverability), related to obligations but also applied to ensemble contractuel and that of interdependence related to contracts. She underlines that the concept of interdependence has academic origins but is more promising than that of indivisibilité, especially if 42 See F. Cafaggi (ed.), Il contratto di rete: Commentario, Il Mulino, 2009. the latter is related to parties' intent. She then examines the case law and the distinction between divisible and indivisible ensembles contractuels. Aubert de Vincelles analyses the eff ects of the recognition of contractual network and emphasizes the consequences for interpretation and termination. Each contract must be interpreted in the light of the whole network by taking into account contractual interdependence. She then clarifi es the extent to which contractual liability towards third parties is available and how that contributes to the identifi cation of contractual links. She concludes with a plea for fl exibility. If a European framework were to be devised, it should be fl exible and allow multiple solutions.
The distinctions between the German and the French systems about liability among non-contracting parties are numerous. They are not only related to the rules applied to linked contracts but also to the use of action directe, allowed in France and prohibited, to a large extent, in Germany, Italy, England and other European legal systems. 43 These distinctions aff ect not only the shape of the network but also its existence. By recognizing direct liabilities, systems like the French strengthen interdependences and force reallocation of costs among parties following actions directes. However, in Germany, contracts with eff ects on third party and third party benefi ciary contracts may to some extent play a similar function. Thus, in terms of functional outcomes, the diff erences are not as stark as they may at fi rst sight appear.
The English system analysed by Simon Whittaker takes a diff erent approach. According to Whittaker, English contract law does not recognize the concept of contractual network because it endorses a quite strict notion of privity even after the legislative reform of 1999. But more importantly, the English law of contract, based on parties' freedom, rejects the possibility of imposing eff ects of contracts concluded by other parties. Consent is the guiding principle in Business to Business contracts. Simon Whittaker distinguishes between two diff erent sets of instruments that parties can use in English law: constructing a contractual relationship or use of the contract for the benefi t of third parties. Four diff erent techniques are described within the fi rst set: assignment of rights, duty of care deed, acting on behalf of the harmed third party, agency. The principle of freedom of contract constrains even the application of tort law for recovery of economic losses suff ered by third parties as a consequence of 43 The use of action directe in France is limited to transactions which transfer ownership. When no ownership is transferred then extracontractual liability is the only instrument for claiming damages arising out of a breach of contract where the victim is a third party. See on this C. Aubert de Vincelles, Chapter 6 in this volume. a breach of contract. Whittaker highlights the tension between the need to protect third parties from the consequences of harmful breaches and that of preserving freedom of contract by exercising the power to defi ne the eff ects of a contractual undertaking and its breach. The possibility to seek recovery for breach of contract along the chain defi nes the boundaries of tort law. If C suff ers from a breach committed by A against B and has an action against B, then she should not be given an action in tort directly against A. The duty of care imposed on the breaching party is limited by the rule denying recovery for pure economic losses.
A comparative analysis of the three systems shows that they accord a diff erent role to parties' consent in defi ning contractual interdependence and its eff ects. The diff erent domain of contract law designs the perimeter of extracontractual liability for breaches related to interdependent contracts.
The English system gives parties' consent the most prominent role. 44 In the absence of specifi c indications provided by the parties, bilateral contracts are held to be independent limiting judicial intervention. This approach has expanded the role of tort law to capture the eff ects of breach of contract on third parties. The French system, on the other hand, provides for a default rule that regulates the link even in the absence of specifi c clauses but not against the parties' consent, unless parties' intent to fragment the relationship is fraudulent or would artifi cially fragment a unitary economic activity. 45 The German system seems to take a middle ground position, recognizing a default rule that regulates the link absent explicit indications by the parties but to a more limited extent than the French system. 46 According to Grundmann, the default operates diff erently in a network of consumer contracts and a network of business contracts. Parties' intention is more relevant in the latter, whereas consumer protection requires a diff erent approach in the area of linked contracts between fi rms and consumers.
How do these diff erences and others concerning national contract laws in Europe aff ect the possibility of creating transeuropean contractual networks? The issue is addressed in the contribution by Cafaggi and Clavel in the last part of the book. They examine the Rome I Regulation and analyse the diffi culties of using private international law to defi ne a governance regime. Parties enjoy freedom within the limits of national public order regimes. Problems arise when parties have not defi ned applicable 44 See S. Whittaker, Chapter 7 in this volume. 45 See C. Aubert de Vincelles, Chapter 6 in this volume. 46 See S. Grundmann, Chapter 5 in this volume. laws or have not suffi ciently coordinated in the case of bilateral contract networks. When the contractual network is composed of bilateral contracts whose applicable law diff ers, diff erent notions of interdependence may create tension and destabilize the network. In multilateral contracts, coordination is less of a problem but default rules are missing and the current criteria are not satisfactory. The authors advocate a wider use of dépeçage and a shift from the territorial approach that still characterizes default rules to a functional approach where judges could refer to the European network industrial policy when interpreting choice of law rules. This approach, combined with the draft of Guidelines concerning general principles, could provide a better legal framework to increase and empower transeuropean contractual networks.
The book complements a comparative and European approach on networks, suggesting that economic factors will increasingly push towards inter-fi rm collaboration across Europe and that the legal landscape, currently highly diff erentiated, should be redesigned in order to provide eff ective instruments for industrial policies.
